






Christelis, D., Georgarakos, D., Jappelli, T. and van Rooij, M. (2020) Trust in the central 
bank and inflation expectations. International Journal of Central Banking, 16(6), pp. 1-
37. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 












































University of Naples Federico II, CSEF, CFS, and Netspar 
 
Dimitris Georgarakos 
European Central Bank 
 
Tullio Jappelli 
University of Naples Federico II, CSEF and CEPR 
 
Maarten van Rooij 
De Nederlandsche Bank and Netspar 
 





Using micro data from the 2015 Dutch CentERpanel, we examine whether trust in the European 
Central Bank (ECB) influences individuals’ expectations and uncertainty about future inflation, 
and whether it anchors inflation expectations. We find that higher trust in the ECB lowers inflation 
expectations on average, and significantly reduces uncertainty about future inflation. Moreover, 
results from quantile regressions suggest that trusting the ECB increases (lowers) inflation 
expectations when the latter are below (above) the ECB’s inflation target. These findings hold after 
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For central banks, the management of economic expectations has become a key tool in 
conducting monetary policy (Blinder et al., 2008). To effectively manage expectations, a high level 
of public trust in central banks is necessary. For instance, a high level of trust in the commitment 
and ability of the European Central Bank (ECB) to keep inflation below, but close to, 2 percent can 
anchor medium- and long-term inflation expectations on this target, and make the public view 
deviations from the target as temporary ones. More generally, a trustworthy central bank is more 
likely to increase public confidence about future price stability and the prospects of the economy, 
thereby boosting economic growth.1  
A number of recent studies document that inflation expectations feed into important 
household financial decisions. Malmendier and Nagel (2016) show that households expecting 
higher inflation are less likely to invest in long-term bonds and more likely to borrow through 
fixed-rate mortgages compared to low inflation expectations households. Armantier et al. (2015) 
conduct a financially incentivized investment experiment and find that individuals’ reported 
inflation expectations influence their investment choices in a way that is consistent with economic 
theory. Moreover, D’Acunto et al. (2016) show that an increase in inflation expectations implies a 
higher readiness to purchase durable goods. 
To the best of our knowledge, existing literature does not provide empirical evidence on the 
relationship between trust in central banks and inflation expectations.2 Our paper fills this gap by 
                                                 
1 For instance, persistently high inflation has been historically linked to increased uncertainty about price evolution 
and low public confidence in the economy’s prospects. Such an environment has typically adverse effects on 
individuals’ saving, consumption and investment decisions. As Bernanke (2013) states: “Expectations matter so much 
that a central bank may be able to help make policy more effective by working to shape those expectations.” 
2 The relation between trust and inflation expectations has been recently recognized as a highly policy relevant topic 
that merits empirical investigation: “Another field in which public trust in central banks might prove important is for 
the understanding of the formation of household inflation expectations [….] If low public trust in central banks is 
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investigating whether citizens’ trust in the ECB contributes to individuals’ expectations and 
uncertainty about price growth and the extent to which these expectations are anchored at the 
ECB’s medium term inflation target of below, but close to, 2 percent. More broadly, our paper 
contributes to existing literature which finds that higher social capital and trust are conducive to 
better economic outcomes such as higher growth (see, e.g., Zak and Knack, 2001; Tabellini, 2010). 
We use recent micro data from the CentER panel, a representative survey of the Dutch-
speaking population in the Netherlands, sponsored by the Dutch National Bank (DNB). We survey 
individuals during the first half of 2015 and ask them a set of specially designed questions that 
allow us to construct individual-specific measures of expected inflation and inflation uncertainty. 
Given that the ECB’s policy impacts a broad range of economic outcomes, we collect similar 
information on expectations regarding economic growth. We ask also how much individuals trust 
the ECB. Similar trust questions that aim to measure public trust in the ECB and in other European 
institutions are regularly asked in Eurobarometer surveys since the early 2000s. Existing literature 
has used Eurobarometer data to examine possible determinants of the ECB trust (Bursian and Fürth, 
2015; Ehrmann et al., 2013). Instead, our paper explores the influence of trust in the ECB on 
inflation expectations. Finally, the survey contains a series of questions about the objectives of the 
ECB that allow us to distinguish whether reported trust in the ECB reflects the perceived credibility 
of the institution or simply knowledge about its role. 
Our analysis offers a number of novel findings. First, higher trust in the ECB induces, on 
average, lower one year ahead inflation expectations. This relationship, however, is not uniform 
                                                 
associated with higher household inflation expectations, then swings in public trust in ECB also directly affect its 
ability to deliver on its mandate, although the empirical relevance of this proposition has yet to be tested” (Ehrmann 
et al., 2013, pp. 782-783).  
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across different percentiles of the distribution of inflation expectations. Second, higher trust 
contributes significantly to lower individual uncertainty about future price growth, thus implying 
a form of anchoring of inflation expectations. Third, higher trust in the ECB is associated with 
higher inflation expectations when the latter are at the lower end of the sample distribution, while 
the opposite is true when people have inflation expectations at the upper end. This effect is 
particularly strong for those who report inflation expectations above the ECB target, while it is less 
robust for the part of the distribution that corresponds to expected inflation that is below, but close 
to, 2 percent.  
Taken together, these results point to the role that trust in the ECB can play in anchoring 
consumers’ inflation expectations around the ECB’s medium-term inflation target. If expectations 
are well-anchored around the target, the public should be confident about its inflation estimate and 
react little to short movements of higher or lower than expected inflation. Moreover, if anchoring 
of public expectations occurs close to the central bank’s inflation target, equilibrium prices should 
adjust faster towards this target (Bernanke, 2013).  
As the survey was conducted in the first half of 2015, it is noteworthy that the estimated effect 
of trust on anchoring inflation expectations is economically important even in an environment of 
low interest rates and inflation. This suggests that factors such as citizens’ trust in the central bank 
can be important when conventional monetary policy tools turn out to be least effective. 
Fourth, we examine whether estimated effects of trust in the ECB reflect public knowledge 
about the ECB objectives per se (e.g. the numerical target for inflation) or credibility more broadly 
defined (e.g. in ECB’s commitment to maintain price stability). To this end, we control for 
respondents’ knowledge regarding the ECB’s objectives or their financial sophistication and results 
remain unchanged. This suggests that people’s perceptions about the credibility of an institution 
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can influence their inflation expectations over and above their knowledge about the specific 
objectives of the institution. It also highlights the long-term advantages of establishing a reputation 
for central bank credibility as it could operate beyond precise knowledge about central bank’s 
objectives or temporary deviations from them.3 Fifth, trust in the ECB is also positively associated 
with expectations about economic growth, but not with the expected variability of output growth. 
In the investigation, we estimate several empirical models to make sure that the effects we 
uncover are due to individuals’ trust in the ECB as an institution and not to other possible 
confounding factors. As we discuss in detail in Section 4, we identify our parameters of interest 
through instrumental variable (IV) estimation using information on episodes of cheating by repair 
persons that respondents have experienced in the past few years. We assume that exposure to such 
events is correlated with the social capital component of trust in the ECB, but has not an 
independent effect on inflation expectations. We also use, as a second instrument, the trust that 
respondents have in other people, as interpersonal trust is unlikely to directly shape inflation 
expectations. The test of the overidentification restrictions strongly suggests that the null 
hypothesis of the exogeneity of these instruments cannot be rejected. 
Moreover, we control not only for standard socio-economic characteristics but also for 
respondents’ general economic knowledge by means of three standard questions that have been 
developed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) and are widely used to measure financial literacy. In a 
related vein, we measure and control for individuals’ specialized knowledge about the ECB’s 
objectives. The main findings on the role of trust in the ECB remain unaffected when we control 
for these indicators of knowledge about the ECB and financial literacy, which suggests that genuine 
                                                 
3 Kril et al. (2016) provide a thorough discussion of the economic advantages of central bank credibility.  
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trust in the institution impacts inflation expectations over and above knowledge about the ECB’s 
mission or economics in general. Furthermore, our main findings are unaffected when a measure 
of individual optimism is included in our specifications. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant studies on 
inflation expectations and trust in institutions. Section 3 describes the survey data. Section 4 
presents the baseline empirical results on inflation expectations, uncertainty and anchoring. Section 
5 presents a number of robustness checks, and Section 6 contains additional results on expectations 
about economic growth and output variability. Section 7 summarizes our main findings. 
 
2. Inflation expectations and trust 
Our paper spans different strands of the literature on inflation expectations and trust. Recent 
studies explore links between survey-based inflation expectations, anchoring around central bank’s 
inflation target and understanding of monetary policy operations. In particular, Kumar et al. (2015) 
survey firms’ managers in New Zealand and find evidence that their inflation expectations are not 
anchored, despite the Reserve Bank’s inflation targeting for more than twenty-five years. Carvalho 
and Nechio (2014) provide evidence that some US households form expectations consistent with a 
Taylor rule. Kril et al. (2016) use survey data from Israel to examine the determinants of central 
bank credibility and trust. Based on a detailed set of questions, they document that the public 
perception about central bank credibility is primarily linked to views regarding the professionalism 
and independence of the central bank and not with its transparency per se.  
While there are only few studies using survey-based information on inflation expectations, 
there are several papers on anchoring and inflation expectations based upon financial market 
instruments such as inflation options, swaps and index linked securities. Some of these studies 
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investigate central bank credibility, mostly after estimating it using financial market-based 
expectations (see, e.g., Gerlach-Kristen and Moessner, 2014; Gürkaynak et al., 2010). Kril et al. 
(2016), on the other hand, argue that these inflation expectations reflect the combined assessment 
of economic conditions and central bank credibility. Instead, they measure central bank credibility 
based upon the confidence of the public in central bank forecasts for inflation and economic 
growth. Their discussion and results indicate that while trust and credibility are multidimensional 
concepts, they are closely related to each other.4 In our paper, we interpret trust as a measure of the 
institutional credibility of the ECB, while in a robustness analysis we show that such institutional 
trust is not confounded by knowledge of the ECB’s objectives.5 
A related group of studies focuses on the role of central bank communication for financial 
market outcomes; Blinder et al. (2008) provide a thorough review. For example, Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2005) show that press statements by central banks have an immediate impact on 
financial markets and also affect the latter’s ability to anticipate future monetary policy decisions. 
In contrast to these studies, we elicit survey-based consumer expectations on future inflation and 
its uncertainty and link them to reported trust in the ECB. 
There is also a large body of literature studying the implications of trust in other people and 
social capital in different domains: economic growth (Zak and Knack, 2001; Guiso et al., 2004; 
Tabellini, 2010), confidence in the government (Knack and Keefer, 1997), financial integration 
(Ekinci et al., 2009), cross-country trade (Guiso et al., 2008), and household portfolios (Guiso et 
                                                 
4 Indeed, the concept of central bank credibility was popularized as a solution to the time-inconsistency problem 
discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1977). One solution to this problem was to delegate monetary policy to a central 
bank or another institute with a high perceived credibility so that the public can have sufficient trust in the central 
banks’ ability to withstand the temptation to create surprise short-term inflation.  
5 In the terminology of Kril et al. (2016), the knowledge component refers to reasoned trust/credibility while 
institutional trust refers to an affective form of trust/credibility. 
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al., 2008; Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011). Another group of studies explores the determinants of 
trust in institutions, and central banks in particular.6 A robust finding of the literature on social 
capital is that trust in other people changes slowly over time, given that social capital consists of a 
large inherited component of social values and norms (Tabellini, 2010).7 On the other hand, 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) point out that specific trust in financial institutions is more 
responsive to prevailing economic conditions.  
 
3. The CentER Internet panel 
We use data from the CentER Internet panel, which is sponsored by DNB and maintained by 
CentERdata at Tilburg University.8 The baseline survey is conducted annually, and collects 
detailed information on a range of demographic and economic variables for a representative sample 
of Dutch-speaking households. In addition to the baseline survey, respondents answer questions 
during the course of a year in special purpose surveys.  
We designed such a special purpose survey that measures individuals’ expectations and 
uncertainty about future price growth as well as trust in the ECB. We administered the special 
survey to every panel participant aged 18 and older in January 2015. The survey was repeated in 
June 2015 to account for a possible seasonal pattern in responses and to increase sample size.  
To elicit the distribution of expected inflation we follow a similar procedure as in Guiso et al. 
(2002; 2013) and Christelis et al. (2019), who estimate the subjective distribution of expected 
                                                 
6 For recent studies see Bursian and Fürth (2015), Wälti (2012), Ehrmann et al. (2013) or Van der Cruijsen et al. (2016). 
7 Societal attitudes are often considered as slow-moving, but there are also instances that they adapt relatively fast to 
the environment. For example, Guiso et al. (2006) refer to culture as those customary beliefs and values that are 
transmitted fairly unchanged from generation to generation. On the other hand, Fernandez (2011) mentions as a 
counterexample the rapid change (i.e., within half a century) in attitudes towards married women working. 
8 Panel members are recruited via personal or telephone interviews. If, after being selected for panel participation, it 
turns out that respondents have no computer with Internet access, CentERdata provides them the necessary equipment.  
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income, pension replacement rate and consumption, respectively. Specifically, we ask respondents 
to report the minimum 𝑦  and the maximum 𝑦  values of percentage change in the level of 
prices twelve months ahead. Subsequently, we ask them to indicate on a 0-100 scale the probability 
that the average change in prices in the next twelve months will be higher than the mid-point 
between the reported minimum and maximum, i.e., 𝜋 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦 𝑦 𝑦 2⁄ . The questions 
we use are reported in Online Appendix A.1. 
To estimate the moments of the subjective distribution of expected inflation we rely on the 
assumptions and methods used by Guiso et al. (2002) and Christelis et al. (2019) to estimate the 
subjective distribution of future income and consumption, respectively. We assume that the 
subjective distribution is either simple triangular (i.e., symmetric around 𝑦 𝑦 2⁄ , assuming 
𝜋 0.5), or split triangular (𝜋 0.5; see Figure A.1. in Online Appendix A.1). Based on the 
elicited values of 𝑦 , 𝑦  (and of 𝜋 if we assume a split triangular distribution) we compute the 
individual-specific mean and standard deviation of the distribution of expected inflation one year 
ahead. The formulae of these statistics are reported in Online Appendix A.2.9 
We set values of the moments of the individual-specific subjective expected inflation 
distributions to missing when 𝑦 , 𝑦  or 𝜋 are missing, or when respondents choose the ‘don’t 
know’ option. The original sample includes 4,333 observations in the two survey waves. Due to 
missing values, the estimation sample includes 3,117 observations that allow the computation of 
inflation expectations using the simple triangular distribution, and 3,019 observations using the 
split triangular distribution. 
                                                 
9 We assume that ym and yM represent the actual minimum and maximum of the distribution. This is potentially a strong 
assumption. Dominitz and Manski (1997) use the percentage chance format to elicit the subjective income distribution, 




The survey also asks individuals to indicate their level of trust in the ECB on a 0 to 10 scale, 
where 0 denotes no trust in the ECB whatsoever, while 10 denotes full trust. A similar question has 
been regularly asked in Eurobarometer surveys since the early 2000s so as to measure public trust 
in the ECB as well as in other institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union, the 
national Parliament and the national government.10 Eurobarometer data have been used by several 
studies to examine determinants of trust in the ECB or its evolution over time (see, e.g., Bursian 
and Fürth, 2015; Ehrmann et al., 2013; Wälti, 2012). 
It is important to note that we ask the question on trust in the ECB without making any explicit 
reference to its objective of an inflation rate at or slightly below 2 percent. We do this for a number 
of reasons. First, we want to avoid conditioning the answers to the question on trust in the ECB. 
Given respondents’ expected inflation, reminding them of the ECB’s target inflation rate may 
change their answer. For instance, those who expect inflation next year to be 3 percent, when 
reminded that the ECB target rate is 2 percent, could reduce their reported trust. Second, we need 
to measure respondents’ trust in the ECB given their current knowledge about economic affairs, 
without influencing this knowledge. Third, we aim to distinguish the notion of trust as institutional 
credibility from that of trust as institutional knowledge. This is why we control separately for the 
latter in our empirical specification, as discussed in Section 5 below. Making this distinction would 
have been impossible if we had mentioned explicitly the ECB inflation target in the question. 
Finally, while the primary target of the ECB is the inflation rate, its mandate states that it also aims 
                                                 
10 The Eurobarometer question has three answer options: “Tend to trust”, “Tend not to trust”, or “Do not know”. Our 
question asks for the intensity of trust using a 0-10 scale (similar to the answer scale in questions on trust in other 
people used in surveys such as the European Social Survey).  
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to promote economic growth, with no prejudice to achieving its inflation target. The weight given 
to the two objectives can vary over time in practice. 
To separate the notions of trust and institutional knowledge, we ask a series of questions to 
measure knowledge about the ECB’s objectives and basic financial literacy (see Online Appendix 
A.1 for the exact wording of these questions). Other studies have asked related questions that 
capture knowledge of the ECB’s objectives. For instance, Van der Cruijsen et al. (2015) find a low 
prevalence of knowledge of the ECB’s objectives. In our survey, we present six statements about 
the ECB’s objectives. These statements mention specific numerical targets (e.g., for 
unemployment), in order to make sure that individuals are not confused with the fact that the ECB’s 
policies can have broader positive economic consequences beyond price stability. Importantly, to 
avoid framing effects, we place the questions on expected inflation, trust in the ECB and knowledge 
about its objectives in separate sections of the questionnaire.11  
To purge the relation between trust and inflation expectations from the effect of financial 
literacy, we ask the three basic financial literacy questions proposed by Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2014). The questions aim to capture individuals’ numeracy and understanding of basic economic 
concepts such as interest rates, inflation and risk diversification, and have been used in many 
studies and countries (see Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014, for an overview). 
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of the expected minimum and maximum levels of 
inflation 12 months ahead.12 For each observation in the sample, the maximum is greater than the 
                                                 
11 As the latter set of questions makes reference to numerical targets that may (or may not) be among the objectives of 
the ECB, we have placed them in the last part of the questionnaire to avoid bias in the answers to questions on inflation 
expectations and/ or trust in the ECB. 
12 Note that while our survey focuses on 12 months ahead inflation expectations, in recent consumer expectations 
surveys, respondents seem to provide similar answers to questions about short term (1 year) and medium term (3 year) 




minimum. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the probability that the expected inflation is above 
the mid-point of the expected minimum and maximum values. As can be seen, there is a prevalence 
of “50 percent” responses but also a sizable number of responses with values larger or smaller than 
50 percent. We note that responses to the question on this probability, which is arguably more 
difficult to answer, are not used in our baseline regressions, which rely on expectations computed 
using the simple triangular distribution. 
Table 1 reports cross-sectional estimates of the median and coefficient of variation of the 
subjective distributions of expected inflation and expected growth, assuming that the underlying 
distribution is a simple (i.e., symmetric) triangular. At the median, the minimum expected inflation 
is 1 percent, while the maximum is 2 percent (the means are equal to 1.3 percent and 2.7 percent, 
respectively). The median probability is 0.50 (average 0.47). Assuming that the distribution is 
simple triangular, we estimate that the sample median of expected inflation is 1.6 percent (average 
2 percent), while the median (mean) variance of the distribution of expected inflation is 0.04 
percent (0.21 percent). The coefficient of variation of the distribution of expected inflation, that is, 
the ratio of its standard deviation to its mean, is 1.09, which implies that respondents experience 
considerable uncertainty about future inflation. 
Given that inflation in the Netherlands in 2015 and 2016 was extremely low by historical 
standards (0.2 and 0.1 percent according to the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices), the median 
expected inflation (1.6 percent) turned out to be an overestimate of the realized values. This is in 
line with evidence from other surveys on inflation expectations (see Kliesen, 2015, and Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko, 2015, for evidence from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers), 
and could also reflect perceptions of price developments in the particular bundle of goods that each 
household regularly spends on.  
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The respective sample median (mean) of expected GDP growth is 1.5 (1.47) percent, while 
the median (mean) variance of the distribution of expected growth is 0.02 percent (0.11 percent). 
As regards trust in the ECB (asked on a 0 to 10 scale), the median (mean) is 5 (4.77) and the 
standard deviation is 2.16. The table also shows summary statistics on socio-economic 
characteristics that are taken into account in the estimation (age, household size, marital status, 
education and income). 
Cross-sectional averages summarize the expected inflation distribution of a typical individual 
but hide important heterogeneity across individuals. Assuming that the underlying distribution is 
simple triangular, Figures 4 and 5 plot the histogram of the means and variances, respectively, of 
the 3,117 individual-specific distributions of expected inflation. Both figures highlight the 
considerable heterogeneity in expected inflation distributions. For instance, for 6.7 percent of 
individuals the mean expected inflation is 0 or negative, for another 20.4 percent it is between 0 
and 1 percent, for another 38.7 percent it is between 1 and 2 percent, and for the remaining 34.2 
percent the mean expected inflation is higher than 2 percent. The cross-sectional distribution of 
variances is also heterogeneous, with roughly 13 percent of respondents exhibiting zero variance 
in their expected inflation distribution (i.e., they do not report any uncertainty about future 
inflation).  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Regression analysis 
Before moving to regression analysis, we plot the mean of expected inflation and its variance 
by bins of trust in the ECB. The results are shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. The figures 
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suggest a negative association between trust in the ECB and both expected inflation and the 
variance of expected inflation. 
Since the patterns of Figures 6 and 7 may be influenced by other confounding variables, we 
estimate the relation between average expected inflation or the variance of expected inflation and 
reported trust in the ECB by estimating the following equation: 
                                          𝑔 𝜋  𝛼 𝛽𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡_𝐸𝐶𝐵 𝛾𝑿 𝜀      (1) 
where g is a function denoting either mean or variance of expected inflation πe deduced from a 
simple triangular or split triangular distribution and taking individual-specific values. Variables in 
X include demographics, such as age (by means of a second order polynomial) and gender of the 
respondent, whether (s)he has a partner, size of the household, whether the respondent is a high 
school graduate or has a college degree, and household income. Finally, we include a survey wave 
dummy to take into account country-wide conditions (e.g., actual past or current inflation and GDP 
growth) as well as region fixed effects that control for economic developments at the regional level.  
To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize the mean and variance of expected inflation 
at the top and bottom 1 percent of the observations; that is, we set the values of those observations 
equal to those at the 99th and 1st percentiles, respectively. We also use Huber-White robust standard 
errors clustered at the household level to take into account that for some households, multiple 
members can participate in the survey. 
First, we estimate (1) for mean expected inflation using OLS. Results are shown in the 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. We find a negative association between trust in the ECB and average 
inflation expectations that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The OLS coefficient of 
trust in the ECB is equal to 0.055 percentage points, which implies that a one standard deviation 
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increase in trust (equal to 2.16) is associated with a reduction in expected inflation of 0.12 percent, 
which corresponds to 7 percent of the sample average of expected inflation. As we show below, 
however, the average response obtained by OLS is not uniform across different percentiles of the 
expected inflation distribution.  
Household size is negatively associated with higher inflation expectations.13 This may 
reflect the fact that households with more than one member include several potential shoppers who 
may in turn be more efficient in identifying cheaper products and services, make better deals, or 
reduce per unit cost by purchasing larger quantities. The coefficients of other demographic 
variables are not statistically different from zero.  
Next, we use an IV approach to address endogeneity problems that may affect the OLS 
estimates of equation (1), and which could arise due to omitted variables and/ or reverse causality. 
Finding valid instruments in our context requires finding variables that correlate with trust in the 
ECB, but do not have a direct association with inflation expectations. The latter condition precludes 
the use as instruments of variables that may be correlated with institutional or economic 
knowledge, such as own experience with retail banking services or credit card fraud, as these may 
have an independent impact on inflation expectation formation. Instead, we exploit variation in the 
component of trust in the ECB that relates to social capital. The latter typically reflects prevailing 
social values and tends to be resilient to temporary variations in financial conditions.  
Respondents in our survey report the frequency they have been cheated by a plumber, 
builder, car mechanic or other repair person over the past five years. Roughly one out of five 
respondents report having been cheated by a repair person at least once. The identifying assumption 
                                                 
13 Fritzer and Rumler (2015) report a similar finding for Austrian households. 
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is that those who have been cheated tend to trust less, and that part of this mistrust carries over to 
the trust they show in institutions. Cheating experiences on some common everyday exchanges are 
arguably exogenous to own actions, so that instrument validity rests upon the assumption that 
exposure to such incidents does not have a direct impact (i.e., other than through trust in the ECB) 
on individuals’ inflation expectations.  
To increase the efficiency of our estimates and generate overidentifying restrictions, we 
also use as an instrument the reported trust in other people. Trust in other people has a strong 
intergenerational component that consists of inherited social norms. Thus, it is likely to respond 
less to contemporaneous economic and personal conditions than trust attached to financial 
institutions (see Tabellini, 2010 and Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011). Accordingly, we assume that 
general trust in other people is likely to influence inflation expectations only through institutional 
trust in the ECB.  
The IV results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. The F-test statistic from the first 
stage regressions is equal to about 86, which suggests that the instruments are quite strong (results 
are shown in Online Appendix Table A.1). In addition, both instruments are correlated with trust 
in the ECB in an expected way. Moreover, a test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen’s J-test) 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of joint instrument validity with high confidence. Hence, we find 
no evidence of consistency problems in the IV estimates. Finally, a Hausman test of the 
endogeneity of the variable of interest, i.e., trust in the ECB, has a p-value equal to 0.046, which 
implies that one can marginally reject the null of exogeneity of trust in the ECB at the 5 percent 
significance level, and thus that IV estimation is likely advisable. 
The IV estimate of the effect of trust in the ECB on expected inflation is -0.17 percentage 
points, that is, somewhat larger in absolute value than the OLS one. The IV estimate implies that 
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an increase in trust in the ECB of one standard deviation reduces expected inflation by 0.38 
percentage points, which is 22 percent of the sample mean. The larger absolute value of the IV 
estimate compared to the OLS one could be due to the presence of unobserved variables that affect 
positively both trust in the ECB and inflation expectations, thus leading to an algebraically larger 
(i.e., less negative, but smaller in absolute value) OLS estimate. Such unobservable variables could 
include, for instance, expectations about unemployment or the general state of the economy. 
Alternatively, the difference between OLS and IV estimates could be due to the fact that in the 
presence of a heterogeneous effect of trust in the ECB this estimate represents a local average 
treatment effect, that is, the effect of trust in the ECB on inflation for those who change their trust 
in the ECB due to changes in the instrument values. On the other hand, the OLS estimate represents 
the overall average treatment effect. 
Having examined the role of trust in the ECB on average inflation, we focus next on the 
role of trust on inflation uncertainty. Recall that the survey design allows us to deduce a measure 
of uncertainty about inflation that is individual-specific. That is, we can estimate a version of 
equation (1) in which the dependent variable represents the individual-specific expected variance 
of inflation. As it was the case for the expected inflation, its variance is calculated using a simple 
triangular distribution.  
OLS estimates are reported in columns 5 and 6 in Table 2. We find that a higher trust in the 
ECB leads to a lower variance of the expected inflation distribution. The effect is precisely 
estimated (p-value < 0.01) and implies that a one standard deviation increase in trust in the ECB 
reduces inflation uncertainty by about 30 percent of its sample mean. 
The corresponding IV estimate (shown in columns 7-8 of Table 2) is again precisely 
estimated (p-value < 0.05) and implies that a one standard deviation increase in the ECB reduces 
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inflation uncertainty by about 50 percent of its sample mean. Once more, the J-test of 
overidentifying restrictions clearly indicates that the null hypothesis of joint instrument validity 
cannot be refuted. The Hausman test for endogeneity suggests that the null cannot be rejected. 
Based on these results, the preferred estimates are those derived using standard OLS. 
 
4.2 Quantile Regressions  
Results thus far suggest that higher trust in the ECB lowers inflation expectations on 
average. Nevertheless, this effect may not be symmetric across the distribution of expected 
inflation, that is, it might differ between those who have high and those who have low inflation 
expectations. In fact, the negative average estimated effect may simply reflect the public view that 
central banks are primarily concerned about actual inflation exceeding target inflation, and 
therefore are committed to raising interest rates to restrain inflation. That is, central banks have 
traditionally built their reputation as safeguards of price stability in situations when inflation tends 
to exceed their medium-term target. Consequently, a high level of public trust in the ECB could 
reflect trust in the ECB’s commitment and ability to fight high inflation and thereby induces lower 
inflation expectations.14  
Results also show that trust in the ECB significantly lowers inflation uncertainty, 
suggesting that trust may induce a form of anchoring of inflation expectations. We shed more light 
on this important policy issue by examining whether trust in the ECB contributes to anchoring of 
expectations around the ECB’s target for an inflation below, but close to, 2 percent. To that effect, 
                                                 
14 The explanation that public trust in the ECB responds slowly to contemporaneous economic conditions is consistent 
with the important role of social capital in shaping trust in institutions (since social capital consists of a large, slow-
moving, inherited component of social values and norms; see Tabellini, 2010). 
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we estimate a series of Quantile Regressions (QR) to evaluate the effect of trust in the ECB across 
various percentiles of the expected inflation distribution. 
Figure 8 plots the estimates and associated 95 percent confidence intervals of the effect of 
trust in the ECB derived from QR evaluated at every five quantiles of the conditional expected 
inflation distribution (the respective estimates are reported in Online Appendix Table A2). The 
figure also plots the OLS estimate and confidence band from the baseline specification discussed 
above. The vertical line is drawn at the percentile of the expected inflation distribution that 
corresponds to a 2 percent inflation, that is, the ceiling of the medium-term ECB target. 
 The QR estimates imply that trust in the ECB raises inflation expectations among 
individuals with low inflation expectations. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in trust 
has a positive and strongly statistically significant effect at the 10th and 20th quantiles of the 
expected inflation distribution (corresponding to 0.35 percent and 0.75 percent expected inflation, 
respectively), which is equal to 0.16 percent and 0.08 percent, respectively. On the other hand, QR 
estimates at the sixth and higher deciles display a negative sign, suggesting a progressively stronger 
negative association of trust in the ECB with inflation expectations among those with higher 
inflation expectations. Notably, the magnitude of the QR coefficients is stronger on the upper part 
of the distribution compared to the lower one: a one standard deviation increase in trust in the ECB 
decreases inflation expectations by 0.28 percent and 0.44 percent at the 80th and 90th percentiles of 
the expected inflation distribution, respectively. 
Finally, QR estimates in the middle part of the expectation distribution are not statistically 
significant. This part of the distribution includes those who have inflation expectation around 2 
percent (denoted by the vertical line), which implies that those who have expectations already 
aligned with the ECB target change them very little when their trust in the ECB increases.  
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Taken together, results from QR point into the role that trust in the ECB has in anchoring 
consumers’ inflation expectations around the ECB’s inflation target. In addition, the fact that 
estimated effects are stronger among those with high inflation expectations suggests that higher 
trust in the ECB can be more effective in lowering high inflation expectations than raising low 
inflation expectations. This finding may be a cause for concern in circumstances like those of the 
recent past, in which inflation in the euro area was well below the ECB’s medium-term target. 
We also use an IV approach to the QR estimates, using the same two instruments employed 
earlier in standard IV. Available IV methods for QR require some modifications of the original 
specification. In particular, both the trust in the ECB variable and our two instruments have to be 
redefined as binary variables. Hence, the modified trust in the ECB variable is equal to zero for 
values of trust below 7, while it is equal to 1 for values higher than or equal to 7. This implies that 
a change from 0 to 1 in the modified trust in the ECB variable corresponds to a change of about 5 
units (or 2.3 standard deviations) in the original variable. 
The IV QR estimates for various percentiles are shown in Figure 9, and also in Online 
Appendix Table A2. The estimated coefficients are larger in absolute terms compared to the 
respective ones from standard QR, as they reflect a much larger underlying change in the trust in 
the ECB variable. Moreover, IV QR estimates suggest a similar pattern for the role of trust in the 
ECB across percentiles of the expected inflation distribution to the one derived using standard QR 
estimates: the results at the upper part of the expectation distribution are quite stronger than those 
at the lower part, which are statistically significant at percentiles below the 10th one.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
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In this section we examine whether our baseline results pick up the effect of some 
alternative factors that may influence inflation expectations and its uncertainty.15 Moreover, we 
report few additional robustness checks. 
One potential channel through which trust in the ECB can influence inflation expectations 
is through the knowledge about the ECB’s objectives. Earlier research has found a positive 
correlation between trust in the ECB and knowledge about the ECB (Ehrmann et al., 2013). More 
broadly, general economic knowledge is likely to influence economic expectations (Christensen et 
al., 2006). To that effect, we investigate whether specific knowledge of the ECB’s objectives in 
particular, or economic literacy in general, influence inflation expectations as well as the estimated 
effect of trust in the ECB.  
To measure knowledge about the ECB’s objectives we ask respondents six true-false 
questions about these objectives and construct an index representing the number of correct 
responses (see Online Appendix A.1 for the wording of these questions).16 A correlation analysis 
shows that knowledge and trust are positively associated. Moreover, descriptive statistics results 
suggest that knowledge on the ECB goals is not broad based, in line with the findings of Van der 
Cruijsen et al. (2015). In fact, in most of questions, around 40 percent of respondents report that 
they do not know the answer. The average number of correct answers is 3.04, out of a maximum 
score of 6. Nevertheless, 42 percent of respondents correctly indicate that that an inflation rate 
below, but close to, 2 percent is a goal of the ECB.17  
                                                 
15 Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.  
16 Possible answers include a “do not know” option, which we consider to be equivalent to an erroneous response.  




Having an individual measure of institutional knowledge about the ECB allows us to assess 
whether reported trust in the ECB mainly reflects perceived credibility of the institution or simply 
knowledge about its role. Before discussing results from formal regression analysis, we note that 
if responses to the trust in the ECB question reflected credibility rather than knowledge, 
respondents would report similar trust towards the DNB. Being part of the euro system, the DNB 
is likely to have similar credibility as the ECB, but obviously it does not have a national inflation 
mandate anymore. Indeed, responses to the trust in the ECB question are highly correlated with 
those on a similar question we have asked about trust in the DNB (the correlation is 0.85, and 
significant at the 1 percent level), which suggests that respondents answer the relevant questions 
having institutional credibility in mind. 
To assess how institutional knowledge affects our results, we add the index of the number 
of correct questions as an additional covariate to the baseline specification. OLS and IV results, 
both for expected inflation and variance of inflation expectations, are virtually unchanged. Thus, 
while knowledge and trust are positively correlated, our results suggest that the institutional 
credibility aspect of the trust in the ECB that affects inflation expectations over and above 
knowledge about the ECB goals. 
We further examine the role of knowledge by using information on whether respondents 
answer correctly the questions on the ECB’s numerical inflation target. In particular, we distinguish 
between two groups of respondents. The “has a clue” group consists of those answering correctly 
the ECB 2 percent inflation target question as well as at least three other questions (out of the six 
in total). The “no clue” group consists of those not knowing about the 2 percent inflation target and 
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failing to answer correctly three or more questions.18 When we re-estimate our baseline models 
(i.e., those shown in Table 2 and QR) we do not find significant differences in the implied effect 
of trust in the ECB on inflation expectations between the two groups.  
These results are in line with our earlier findings of an independent influence of the 
institutional credibility on inflation expectations over and above knowledge about the ECB’s 
objectives. With respect to the group that knows about the ECB’s numerical inflation target, our 
findings imply that trusting the central bank can anchor their inflation expectations around it, as 
they most likely view deviations from the target as temporary ones. As regards the group that does 
not know about the central bank numerical inflation target, QR results again suggest some 
anchoring at a broader range around 2 percent, possibly because inflation at this range is compatible 
with the notion of price stability that this group has. Indeed, responses from a separate survey show 
that three out of four respondents think that it is most favorable for the Dutch economy if in each 
year the general level of prices remains stable or increases slightly. 
Second, we measure respondents’ financial literacy as regards some basic economic 
concepts using three standard questions extensively used in the related literature (see Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2014). When including financial literacy in our specifications, the estimated effects of 
trust in the ECB on inflation expectations are once again unchanged.  
A third factor that may correlate with trust in the ECB and/ or inflation expectations is 
individual optimism. To this end, we first construct an indicator of optimism by taking the 
difference between subjective life expectancy (i.e., self-reported probability to survive upon age 
                                                 
18 Note that the additional restriction of answering at least three other knowledge questions removes from the “has a 
clue” group clueless respondents whose correct answer that the ECB aims at a price level below but close to 2 percent 
is due to a guess. 
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65, 80 or 90, depending on the current age) and objective life expectancy (by gender and age) in 
official mortality tables (see also Puri and Robinson, 2007, who utilize a similar measure of 
optimism). In all cases the coefficient of trust in the ECB is hardly affected.19 Furthermore, we add 
an alternative measure of optimism in our specification using information from a self-reported 
measure of optimism.20 Once more, the estimated effect of trust in the ECB remains unaffected. 
Overall, the estimates suggest that trust in the ECB has an effect on economic expectations 
even controlling for the effect of knowledge about the ECB’s functions, financial literacy, and 
optimism. 
Trust in the ECB, and more precisely the institutional credibility or social capital 
component of trust, may reflect beliefs and values shared by individuals living in the same area. 
Therefore, we examine whether our baseline results are likely affected by unobserved regional 
heterogeneity, including possible regional differences in trust in the ECB. To this end, we re-
estimate our baseline models after accounting for regional fixed effects at the level of the twelve 
Dutch provinces (which represent the most detailed regional classification available in our data). 
Results remain virtually unchanged. In addition, we re-estimate these models by clustering the 
standard errors at the province level to allow for possible within province error dependence. 
Clustering at such an aggregate level, leaves our baseline estimates on trust in the ECB (shown in 
Table 2) statistically significant at 5%. 
                                                 
19 Estimated effects of the trust in the ECB variable remain statistically significant, but the p-value is higher compared 
to the baseline specification. This is due to the lower number of observations used, as there are missing values of the 
variable denoting subjective life expectancy. 
20 Respondents indicate to which extent they agree (on a scale from 1 to 5) with the following statement: “Overall, I 
expect more good things to happen to me than bad things”. Guiso et al. (2008) use the same measure to disentangle 
the effect of trust on stock investing from that of optimism. 
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As already mentioned, our estimation sample is smaller than the original one, mainly due 
to missing observations in inflation and/ or trust in the ECB questions. To investigate whether our 
results are affected by these missing observations, we impute missing values for these two key 
variables. Adding imputed values increases our estimation sample to 4,248 observations (from 
3,055 observations in the baseline estimation using the simple triangular distribution). Results from 
this larger sample, based on OLS and QR estimates of the relationship between trust in the ECB 
and inflation expectations, are similar to those we present in Section 4 (results on expected inflation 
and its variance are reported in Online Appendix Table A3). 
As a final robustness check, we estimate the baseline specification replacing the simple 
triangular distribution with the split one. We find that the results on inflation expectations, 
uncertainty and anchoring remain unchanged (see Online Appendix Table A4 for these results). 
Similarly, results are robust to assuming alternative distributional forms, such as uniform and split 
uniform distributions. 
 
6. GDP growth 
The broader objectives of monetary policy are not limited to price stability but include also 
other macroeconomic variables, among which economic growth is of course prominent. Hence, it 
is instructive to examine whether trust in the ECB impacts also individual expectations regarding 
economic growth and economic fluctuations (e.g., GDP growth rate volatility). To elicit the 
distribution of expected GDP growth, we ask individuals the same sequence of three questions as 
for inflation: the minimum and maximum expected growth rate, and the chance that growth exceeds 
the midpoint of the reported minimum and maximum.  
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As is the case with inflation expectations, we plot the mean of expected growth and its 
variance by bins of trust in the ECB in Figures 10 and 11, respectively. There is a clear positive 
association between trust in the ECB and individual expectations about economic growth. On the 
other hand, we find essentially no association between trust in the ECB and the variance of expected 
growth. 
The patterns shown in the two figures are confirmed when we estimate multivariate 
regressions with expected growth and its variance as dependent variables. Table 3 reports OLS and 
IV regressions for the mean (columns 1-4) and variance of expected GDP growth (columns 5-8). 
As is the case with inflation expectations, we cluster Huber-White robust standard errors at the 
household level, and winsorize the dependent variables at the top and bottom 1 percent of 
observations.21 The test statistics for the IV regressions suggest again that the instruments are 
strong and that one cannot reject instrument exogeneity. At the same time, the Hausman test does 
not reject the null hypothesis that trust in the ECB is exogenous. Therefore, one could restrict 
attention to the OLS estimates. Yet, to maintain consistency with our analysis of expected inflation 
and its variance, we present both OLS and IV results. In any case, both analyses lead to qualitatively 
similar estimates of the effects of trust in the ECB. 
In particular, we find that trust in the ECB increases expected GDP growth. According to 
the baseline OLS estimate, a one standard deviation higher trust in the ECB implies an increase in 
expected GDP growth by 17 basis points. The coefficient is statistically significant (at the 1 percent 
level) and the effect corresponds to 12 percent of the sample mean of expected GDP growth. The 
corresponding IV estimate is somewhat higher (27 basis points, corresponding to 18 percent of the 
                                                 
21 The number of observations is slightly higher as the number of “do not know” responses to the GDP growth questions 
is lower than for the inflation questions (see also Christensen et al., 2006). 
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sample mean). In contrast, results in columns 5 to 8 imply that trust has no effect on the uncertainty 
about expected GDP growth.22 As regards other covariates, we find a negative (positive) 
association between the female dummy and expecting a higher (being more uncertain about the) 
growth rate. This seems aligned with insights from the cognitive psychology literature on the link 
between gender and reactions related to anxiety about the future (e.g. Robichaud et al., 2003). 
The finding that trust in the ECB affects inflation expectations negatively at the mean, and 
growth expectations positively, suggests that respondents on average do not associate necessarily 
higher inflation with higher growth. This could be due to several reasons, including the “Great 
moderation” period that featured both low inflation and economic prosperity, memories of past 
stagflation, or experience drawn from other countries, where deep recessions have been 
accompanied by episodes of high inflation rates. 
 
7. Summary 
Historically, central banks have paid a lot of attention to inflation expectations formed in 
financial markets and by professional forecasters. More recently, central banks have shown 
increased interest in consumer expectations and beliefs because they can help make policy more 
effective (Bernanke, 2013; Blinder et al., 2008). In this paper, we investigate the extent to which 
trust in the ECB impacts individuals’ expectations and uncertainty about future inflation and 
induces inflation anchoring at the ECB’s inflation target of below, but close to, 2 percent. The 
                                                 
22 We have also estimated a series of QR regressions to examine whether estimates of trust in the ECB display a pattern 
of anchoring around a specific value of the expected GDP growth distribution. We do not find any evidence for 
anchoring in this case. QR estimates are always positive and decline across quantiles, suggesting that higher trust in 
the ECB is associated with higher expected GDP growth, and more so among those with low GDP growth expectations. 
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empirical evidence draws upon a special questionnaire module introduced in a recent survey of a 
representative sample of the Dutch population. 
A first finding of our analysis is that a high level of trust lowers inflation expectations. This 
result may be due to the fact that traditionally central banks have been mainly concerned about 
inflation exceeding their target and communicated to the public their commitment to raise interest 
rates to restrain inflation. Consequently, a high level of public trust in the ECB is likely to reflect 
trust in the ECB’s commitment and ability to fight high inflation and thereby induces lower 
inflation expectations on average.  
 Recently, central banks have been using unconventional policy instruments to cope with a 
long period of low inflation and near zero interest rates. Based upon a survey among central bank 
presidents and academic experts, Blinder et al. (2017) argue that these new policy instruments as 
well as the increased use of communication will permanently remain in the toolkit of central banks. 
Communication is, among others, important for central banks for anchoring inflation expectations 
around the target inflation rate and preventing medium term inflation expectations from falling 
below target.  
Our findings are directly related to this desired anchoring of inflation expectations because 
they indicate that trust in the ECB induces anchoring around the medium term inflation target. 
Specifically, we show that the effect of trust is not uniform across the distribution of inflation 
expectations: at the lower end of the distribution, an increase in trust increases inflation 
expectations, while the opposite is true at the higher end of the distribution of inflation 
expectations. Estimated effects are particularly strong among respondents having high inflation 
expectations, suggesting that higher trust in the ECB matters more for lowering high inflation 
expectations as opposed to increasing low inflation expectations. This finding may be a cause for 
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concern in a low interest rate environment, especially as regards the segment of the population with 
quite low inflation expectations. It suggests that central banks may benefit from effectively 
communicating their commitment to raise prices towards their target as forcefully as their 
commitment to fight high inflation in previous times. 
 In a related vein, we also find that trust in the ECB reduces individual uncertainty about 
future inflation, thus contributing to public confidence about future price stability and the 
economy’s prospects.23 Taken together, our findings suggest that a high level of trust supports the 
monetary policy of the ECB because it contributes to the anchoring of inflation expectations in the 
population around the target of below, but close to, 2 percent.  
 One may argue that it is not the institutional credibility of the ECB that matters for our 
findings, but rather the knowledge about the tasks and the goals of the ECB (or the knowledge 
about economic concepts in general). While there is a positive association between knowledge of 
the ECB goals and trust in the ECB, our results are virtually unaffected when knowledge about the 
ECB’s objectives and financial literacy are taken into account. Hence, it appears that the 
institutional credibility component of trust in the ECB has an independent influence on inflation 
expectations. 
 Finally, our findings suggest that the effectiveness of monetary policy could benefit from 
investing in the build-up of trust and institutional credibility. In the current environment of low 
interest rates, where standard monetary policy measures are difficult to implement and likely to be 
less effective, such an investment is likely to be particularly beneficial.  
                                                 
23 From a monetary policy perspective, reduced uncertainty strengthens anchoring around a medium term inflation 
target and induces equilibrium prices to converge faster towards this target (Bernanke, 2013). From a broader 
perspective, reduced uncertainty is beneficial for economic welfare. It helps households’ financial planning and lowers 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Deviation
Minimum expected inflation level 1.303 1.000 1.889





Expected inflation 2.001 1.600 2.187
Variance of expected inflation 0.208 0.042 0.838
Minimum expected growth rate 0.965 1.000 1.499





Expected growth rate 1.465 1.500 1.520
Variance of expected growth rate 0.108 0.020 0.575
Trust in the ECB 4.769 5.0 2.163
Age 50.8 51.0 16.6
Female householder 0.452 0.0 0.498
Household size 2.488 2.0 1.252
Has a spouse/partner 0.747 1.0 0.435
High school graduate 0.383 0.0 0.486
University graduate 0.309 0.0 0.462




Note. All magnitudes related to the expected inflation and growth rate are expressed in percentage points. 
32 
 
Table 2. OLS and IV results for expected inflation and its variance  
 
(1) (3) (5) (7)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Trust_ECB -0.0552 0.0190 *** -0.1736 0.0597 *** -0.0120 0.0030 *** -0.0210 0.0100 **
Age 0.0155 0.0152 0.0090 0.0170 -0.0040 0.0030 -0.0040 0.0030
Age squared -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Female 0.0041 0.0717 -0.0591 0.0812 0.0170 0.0130 0.0090 0.0150
Couple 0.0922 0.1013 0.0726 0.1108 0.0080 0.0200 0.0090 0.0210
Household size -0.1331 0.0353 *** -0.1505 0.0401 *** -0.0170 0.0080 ** -0.0220 0.0090 **
High school graduate 0.1093 0.0989 0.1851 0.1175 0.0010 0.0180 0.0130 0.0210
College graduate 0.0976 0.0929 0.2550 0.1259 ** 0.0180 0.0170 0.0400 0.0210 *
Logarithm of household 
net income
0.0066 0.0343 0.0275 0.0340 -0.0080 0.0090 -0.0040 0.0100
constant 1.5528 0.5116 *** 2.1168 0.6219 *** 0.4700 0.1210 *** 0.4880 0.1430 ***
Region/ wave dummies
First-stage F test 86.433 86.433
Endogeneity test 3.971 0.974
P value 0.046 0.324
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions
0.766 0.314
P value 0.381 0.575
Observations 3,055 2,632 3,055 2,632
yes yes yes yes
OLS IV IVOLS
Variable
(2) (4) (6) (8)
Std. error Std. error Std. error Std. error
Average of expected inflation Variance of expected inflation
 
 
Note. This table shows OLS and IV estimation results from models using expected inflation and its variance (both measured in percentage 
points) as dependent variables. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3. OLS and IV results for expected growth and its variance 
 
(1) (3) (5) (7)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Trust in the ECB 0.0792 0.0106 *** 0.1250 0.0347 *** -0.0010 0.0010 -0.0030 0.0050
Age -0.0104 0.0102 -0.0088 0.0107 -0.0040 0.0020 ** -0.0030 0.0020 *
Age squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Female -0.1481 0.0433 *** -0.1950 0.0466 *** 0.0130 0.0060 ** 0.0100 0.0060
Couple 0.0336 0.0682 0.0415 0.0707 0.0080 0.0090 -0.0010 0.0100
Household size -0.0034 0.0283 -0.0081 0.0295 -0.0030 0.0040 0.0000 0.0040
High school graduate 0.0520 0.0631 0.0786 0.0692 -0.0040 0.0080 0.0010 0.0090
College graduate 0.0738 0.0595 0.0710 0.0745 0.0040 0.0080 0.0120 0.0100
Logarithm of household 
net income
0.0220 0.0232 0.0287 0.0243 0.0020 0.0030 0.0040 0.0020 **
constant 0.9066 0.3309 *** 0.5269 0.3845 0.2060 0.0540 *** 0.1780 0.0600 ***
Region/ wave dummies
First-stage F test 92.332 92.332
Endogeneity test 2.070 0.019
P value 0.150 0.890
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions
0.297 1.419
P value 0.586 0.234
Observations 3,145 2,716 3,145 2,716
Variable
(2) (4) (6) (8)
Mean of expected growth rate Variance of expected growth rate
OLS IV
yes yes yes yes
OLS IV
Std. error Std. error Std. error Std. error
 
 
Note. This table shows OLS and IV estimation results from models using the expected growth rate and its variance (both measured in 
percentage points) as dependent variables. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Figure 1. Histogram of the minimum expected inflation level 
 




Figure 3. Histogram of the probability that expected inflation is 




Figure 4. Histogram of the mean of expected inflation 
 




Figure 6. Average expected inflation by levels of trust in the ECB 
 
Figure 7. Variance of expected inflation by levels of trust in the ECB 
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Figure 8. Quantile regression estimates for expected inflation 
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Figure 10. Average expected GDP growth rate by levels of trust in the ECB 
 
 
Figure 11. Variance of expected GDP growth rate by levels of trust in the ECB 
 
